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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM.  
 
This appeal arises in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in Bailey v. United 
States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). 
 
John Martin ("Appellant") was convicted on December 2, 
1993 of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) 
(possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) ("Count I") 
and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) ("Count II") (use of a firearm 
during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime). He was 
sentenced by the district court to a term of imprisonment 
of thirty-seven months on Count I and a consecutive term 
of sixty months on Count II. This court affirmed both 
convictions on February 24, 1995. 
 
On December 6, 1995, the Supreme Court filed its 
opinion in Bailey, in which it held that a conviction under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using a firearm during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime requires the "active 
employment" of the weapon by the defendant. Bailey, 116 
S. Ct. at 506, 509. The Court's decision has generated 
numerous appeals, both direct and collateral, from 
convictions under section 924(c)(1) that predated the ruling 
in Bailey. 
 
Having lost his direct appeal to this court only ten days 
before the Court decided Bailey, Appellantfiled a motion in 
the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on February 23, 
1996 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence for 
 
                                2 
violating section 924(c)(1). The government concurred in the 
vacatur of the Count II conviction and sentence, but 
requested that Appellant be resentenced on his Count I 
conviction. The district court vacated the Count II 
conviction, but rejected Appellant's jurisdictional and 
constitutional arguments as to the Count I conviction and 
resentenced him to a term of imprisonment of fifty-seven 
months on that count.1 This timely appeal followed. 
 
Appellant argues here that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to resentence him on his Count I conviction, 
which he did not challenge in the section 2255 proceeding. 
He claims that the district court's jurisdiction was limited 
to a review of Count II and the concomitant "sentence" that 
he attacked. Appellant further asserts that his resentencing 
by the district court on Count I violated his due process 
rights and the prohibition against double jeopardy because 
he possessed a legitimate expectation of finality as to the 
portion of his original sentence imposed under Count I. 
 
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review is plenary as to both issues. United States v. 
Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992); Zettlemoyer v. 
Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Since the date of oral argument before us in this case, 
another panel of this court has filed a reported opinion 
holding that a district court has jurisdiction to resentence 
a section 2255 petitioner on unchallenged counts where the 
petitioner successfully attacks a section 924(c)(1) conviction 
on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey. See 
United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 reads: 
 
It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a 
panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the 
holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. 
Court in banc consideration is required to do so. 
 
3d Cir. R., App. I, I.O.P. 9.1 (West Supp. 1997). Given the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the time of the resentencing hearing, Appellant had completed 23 
months of his original, 37-month term of imprisonment on Count I. 
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circumstances here, we conclude that this court's holding 
in Davis dictates our disposition here. See United States v. 
Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201, 1204 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
The order of the district court resentencing Appellant to 
a term of imprisonment of fifty-seven months on his Count 
I convictions will be affirmed. 
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SLOVITER, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment only. 
 
This case raises the important question whether a 
criminal defendant convicted on two counts who 
successfully challenged his conviction on the second count 
on a § 2255 petition pursuant to Bailey v. United States, 
116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), may be resentenced on motion of the 
government on the first count. After this case was argued 
but before we rendered an opinion, another panel of this 
court decided the same issue in United States v. Davis, 112 
F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 1997), holding there was no impediment 
to the resentencing. As the majority states, our Internal 
Operating Procedures bind us to that holding unless 
overturned by the court en banc. I disagree with the holding 
in Davis and use this opportunity to state my position. I 
believe that on collateral review a district court only has 
jurisdiction over the particular sentence challenged in the 
§ 2255 petition, not over all sentences which the petitioner 
may be serving. 
 
The district courts were divided on the issue, with some 
holding that sentencing courts do not have the power to 
resentence a prisoner after a successful collateral attack on 
another count, and others holding that they do. Recently, 
what had been a similar division among the courts of 
appeals has shifted to the position that the district courts 
do have the power to resentence under a broad 
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. 
Rodriguez, 1997 WL 265121, ___ F.3d #6D 6D6D# (5th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Harrison, 1997 WL 232266, #6D 6D6D# F.3d ___ 
(8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26 (1st 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 1997 WL 221217 (1997). But see United States 
v. Handa, 110 F.3d 42 (9th Cir. 1997) (approving district 
court's holding that there was no authority to resentence 
under Rule 35 or § 22551). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The court in Handa nonetheless directed resentencing based on 28 
U.S.C. § 2106 which allows the Supreme Court or any court of appeals 
to modify any sentence brought before it for review "as may be just 
under the circumstances." As far as I know, no other court has relied on 
this provision, and I believe its applicability under these facts is 
questionable. 
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I will concentrate on our Davis opinion as that is the 
controlling precedent. 
 
Martin concedes that if this issue were raised in the 
context of a direct appeal the district court could 
resentence him. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a); United States v. 
Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 950-51 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 
U.S. 918 (1981). However, he notes that the Supreme Court 
has emphasized the distinction between direct review and 
review on a collateral proceeding. In United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979), the Court stated: "It 
has, of course, long been settled law that an error that may 
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support 
a collateral attack on a final judgment." 
 
Section 2255 is the federal analog to the common law 
writ of habeas corpus allowing a criminal defendant to 
challenge a federal sentence. In United States v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952), the Supreme Court explained 
that § 2255 offered the same remedies as a traditional 
habeas petition and was to have the same substantive 
scope. A § 2255 petition, like a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, is a remedy afforded the prisoner, not the 
government, and the government has no power, either at 
common law or by statute, to seek collateral review of a 
prisoner's conviction or sentence. 
 
In its discussion of the purposes behind habeas corpus 
in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934), the Supreme 
Court explained that historically habeas was intended to 
"inquire into the legality of the detention" and could only be 
used if a decision in the prisoner's favor would result in his 
immediate release. Id. at 138. The Court continued: 
"Wherever the issue has been presented, this Court has 
consistently refused to review, upon habeas corpus, 
questions which do not concern the lawfulness of the 
detention." 293 U.S. at 139 (footnote omitted). Patently, the 
government's effort to have the sentence of a convicted 
defendant enhanced raises a question which does not 
concern the "lawfulness of the detention," which was the 
limit of the scope of a collateral review iterated by the 
Court. 
 
It follows that if the sentencing court is to have the 
jurisdiction to enhance the defendant's sentence through 
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the vehicle of a § 2255 petition after the time for direct 
appeal has passed, then its authority to do so, in deviation 
from the practice under a traditional habeas proceeding, 
must derive from specific language in § 2255. That was the 
basis on which the Fourth Circuit in Hillary found the 
authority, focusing on the portion of § 2255 that provides 
that if the district court grants a § 2255 motion, it "shall 
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the 
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct 
the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Hillary interpreted that language as bestowing broad 
remedial powers on the district court to correct a"sentence" 
as it finds "appropriate." See Hillary, 106 F.3d at 1173. 
That interpretation has been adopted in most of the recent 
opinions on this issue in the other courts of appeals. 
 
I find this court's opinion in Davis equivocal as to 
whether it is adopting the conclusion in Hillary that the 
language in § 2255 means that the court is not limited in 
its resentencing options to only the count challenged in the 
motion. On one hand, it approvingly cites Hillary and the 
other courts so holding. On the other hand, it rather deftly 
rests its express holding on a different analysis. 
 
In any event, whether Davis holds or merely suggests 
that the language of § 2255 gives the district court 
authority to enhance an unchallenged sentence, I disagree. 
Placed in context, the court's jurisdiction to "correct" the 
sentence is limited to correction in favor of the petitioning 
prisoner who is determined to be "entitled to relief."2 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides in relevant part: 
 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act 
of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the 
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 
set aside or correct the sentence. 
 
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively 
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause 
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"sentence" that is to be corrected is the one called into 
question by the prisoner on his or her § 2255 petition. This 
is the statutory interpretation also reached by Judge 
Heaney in his dissenting opinion in Harrison, 1997 WL 
232266, at *4. 
 
To be sure, the Davis panel rests its explicit holding on 
a ground other than this broad and, I believe, 
unsupportable statutory interpretation. Instead, in Davis 
the court based its holding on the "interdependence of the 
counts for Guideline sentencing purposes." Davis, 112 F.3d 
at ___ , 1997 WL 195397, at *3. Under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), the court would have imposed a two-level 
enhancement to the sentence on the drug counts for 
possession of a firearm, but Davis' conviction under the 
§ 924(c) count precluded that enhancement. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.4 Background Commentary. Thus, the Davis court 
held that vacating the now invalid § 924(c) sentence 
because of Bailey without resentencing on the remaining 
counts would mean that Davis' "sentence would not be in 
conformity with the law." Davis, 1997 WL 195397, at *4. 
 
In this respect, Davis relied on the "sentencing package" 
doctrine. That doctrine seeks to reconstruct the sentencing 
judge's overall plan in sentencing on a multi-count 
indictment, and holds that when a conviction on one of the 
counts of a multi-count conviction is vacated, the 
sentencing judge "should be free to review the efficacy of 
what remains in light of the original plan, and to 
reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a 
prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds 
that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the 
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to 
collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or 
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render 
the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate 
and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or 
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within applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that 
appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment 
still fits both crime and criminal." United States v. Pimienta- 
Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
890 (1989). 
 
Although I believe the sentencing package doctrine fully 
supports resentencing on a direct appeal, I believe that it 
does not serve to place within "applicable constitutional 
and statutory limits" the disturbance of a sentence at the 
behest of the government after the time for direct appeal 
has run. 
 
Because the "sentencing package" doctrine is based on 
the sentencing court's original intent in fixing the sentence, 
the Supreme Court's decision in Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 
179, is informative regarding the "sentencing package" 
doctrine's applicability to a § 2255 proceeding. Addonizio, a 
former mayor of the city of Newark, New Jersey, was 
convicted of an extortion conspiracy and sentenced to 10 
years imprisonment. See id. at 180 & n.2. While he was 
serving his sentence, the Parole Commission changed its 
policies to take the seriousness of the crime into 
consideration and refused to release Addonizio once he 
became eligible for parole because of the seriousness of his 
crime. Addonizio filed a petition under § 2255, and the 
same judge who had sentenced him granted that petition 
on the ground that at the time he imposed sentence he 
anticipated that Addonizio would be actually confined for 
three and one-half to four years, and that his "sentencing 
expectation" was frustrated by the Parole Commission's 
new policies and procedures. See id. at 183. 
 
This court affirmed but the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that as long as the sentence was a lawful one 
under "all of the objective criteria - federal jurisdiction, the 
Constitution, and federal law," id. at 187, Addonizio was 
not entitled to relief under § 2255. The Court stated, in 
language of interest here, "in our judgment, there is no 
basis for enlarging the grounds for collateral attack to 
include claims based not on any objectively ascertainable 
error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the 
sentencing judge." Id. 
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I recognize that here the expectation of the sentencing 
judge was dependent upon the interaction between the 
statute and the Sentencing Guidelines, whereas in 
Addonizio only the subjective intent of the sentencing judge 
was at issue. Nonetheless, the frustration of the sentencing 
judge's expectation can no more create jurisdiction to open 
a sentence on a count unchallenged in the § 2255 
proceeding than it could authorize resentencing on a count 
dismissed as part of a plea bargain when the counts on 
which the defendant pled and was sentenced are later 
successfully challenged on a § 2255 petition. Inasmuch as 
the intent of the sentencing judge was held in Addonizio to 
be an inadequate basis for a defendant to open the 
sentence under § 2255, I believe it cannot be used to 
support the sentencing package theory as a rationale to 
permit the sentencing judge to revisit the entire sentence 
on a § 2255 motion at the behest of the government. 
 
I find that my views comport with those expressed by the 
court of appeals in Chandler v. United States, 468 F.2d 834 
(5th Cir. 1972), an opinion since limited by that court's 
decision in United States v. Rodriguez, 1997 WL 265121 
(5th Cir. 1997). The defendant in Chandler had been 
convicted of one count of tax evasion and one count of 
subscribing a fraudulent tax return, and was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment on count one and three years 
imprisonment on count two. After the defendant 
successfully moved under § 2255 to vacate the sentence on 
count one because it was in excess of the statutory 
maximum, the district court resentenced her on the second 
count to five years in order to have its sentencing intent 
fulfilled. The court of appeals reversed on double jeopardy 
grounds, holding that the district court could not 
resentence the defendant on a count not raised in her 
§ 2255 petition. 
 
While I prefer to rest my opinion on the lack of 
jurisdiction rather than reach the double jeopardy issue, I 
am impressed by the force of the Chandler court's comment 
that: 
 
To allow the trial court's action in this case to stand 
would place a rather formidable deterrent in the path 
of a convicted defendant who desires to apply for post- 
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conviction relief on only one count of a multi-count 
conviction. By subjecting the defendant to the 
contingency of having a non-challenged sentence 
escalated to the statutory maximum, we would truly be 
inviting the defendant to play `Russian Roulette.' 
 
468 F.2d at at 837. 
 
The concerns raised in Chandler are not merely 
academic, as defendants who have used Bailey to 
successfully challenge their § 924(c) convictions on one 
count of a multi-count indictment and even have completed 
the service of the term to which they were sentenced on the 
other count have been resentenced to a longer term. See, 
e.g., United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531, 532 (7th Cir. 
1996) (enhancing and using the resentence also to correct 
an improper calculation of the base offense level to the 
defendant's detriment); Woodhouse v. United States, 109 
F.3d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1997) (returning a released prisoner 
to prison on the subsequently enhanced sentence). 
 
The availability of a collateral attack via § 2255 is thereby 
being transformed from a symbol of personal liberty into a 
tool for the government to revisit final sentences. Once the 
distinctions between direct review and collateral attacks are 
extinguished, there may be no principle that would prohibit 
a court from resentencing a defendant to an even higher 
sentence than s/he had been given before ever filing the 
petition. The writ that originally could only be used to seek 
immediate release from custody could now be used by the 
government to extend custody. 
 
I recognize that the recent cases from the other circuits 
make my view a lonely one (joined only by Judge Heaney's 
dissent in the Eighth Circuit), but I believe our Davis 
opinion sets us on a dangerous road for which only the 
Supreme Court may provide a different destination. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
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